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Conflict of Laws--A Rationale
of Jurisdiction
By Roy MoLA.D° *
The law, procedural and substantive, is full of historic sur-
vivors. Some of these principles have held on for a century or
more largely because of a lazy following of stare decisis; rules
which have long lost all reason for their continuance and which
repeatedly reach unfortunate results in their application hang
on because of a continued failure to re-examine them in the light
of changed conditions and modem thinking. One of the divisions
of the law where this is most apparent has been in the numerous
outmoded rules and principles having to do with jurisdiction in
the field of Conflict of Laws. Max Bheinstein was expressing a
common appraisal of the situation when he spoke of the "irrational
rules of jurisdiction which presently prevail in the United
States."'
Recently, however, in the last fifteen to twenty-five years,
much change has taken place in the law as to jurisdiction in
Conflict cases. Indeed, the entire Conflict field is in a state of
flux and change, most noticeable in the areas of jurisdiction, torts
and contracts. The law is moving rapidly in each of these cate-
gories. It is the purpose of this study to note these changes in
the jurisdiction phase of the subject, to point out their desirability
and effect, and to suggest further developments which seem to be
needed.
A. INTRODUCTION
The word "jurisdiction" is a term of much ambiguity and
varied employment. In fact, it is often used improperly. For
* Appreciation is expressed for a research fellowship in the amount of $1200
granted from the Faculty Research Fund of the University of Kentucky, which
was materially helpful in this study and the preparation of this paper.
00 Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; LL.B., Uni-
versity of Kentucky; J.D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard University Law
School.
I Book Review, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 83, 91 (1942).
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example, suppose that X hires Y, a skilled artist, to paint his
portrait for $10,000. Y later decides that he will not carry out
the contract and so informs X who sues for specific performance
on the ground that Y's services are unique. In such cases equity
courts sometimes say that they do not have jurisdiction to grant
that kind of relief. Such a statement is in error as the court does
have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, which is
jurisdiction in the proper sense.
If one feels that he must use the word "jurisdiction" in such a
case he should use it as does Clark in his Principles of Equity
where he states that "equity will not exercise its jurisdiction in
such cases."2 The court has jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter, but it will not give the relief asked for because
it is not feasible or practicable. Personal services involuntarily
rendered are usually unsatisfactory. In addition, a decree for
specific performance of a personal services contract is in violation
of the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude.
Such cases deal with matters having to do with whether the
court should give relief, whether it has the ability to make an
effective decree, or whether it has the power to do so. To state
what the court refuses to do in terms of refusal to exercise juris-
diction simply enlarges the ambiguity of a word already too
broad. Better to say the court will refuse to give the relief asked
for-and give the reasons. Anything that will help save the word
"jurisdiction" for its narrow primary meaning is a step in the
proper direction.
Therefore, it is the purpose of this paper to limit the discus-
sions of jurisdiction as narrowly as possible and to use the word
in its technical and primary meaning. Even then the problem
is not an easy one for the narrowed use of the word still leaves a
term of considerable breadth and ambiguity. The Restatement
of Conflicts of Laws, Second, defines jurisdiction as the power
"to create or affect legal interests when a state's contacts with a
person, thing or occurrence are sufficient to make such action
reasonable."' This statement is sufficiently professorial to be
cloudy but the word admittedly is difficult to define,4 even when
2 Clark, Principles of Equity § 62 (1948).
3 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 42 (1958).
4 Id. at Comment,
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an attempt is made to use it in a narrow and primary sense. One
of the most helpful aids to an understanding of the word and
its limitations is to keep constantly in mind that there is a close
connection in Conflict of Laws cases between the rules and
principles of jurisdiction and the requirements of the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Any action in a
particular state which does not meet the requirements of due
process is void in that state for lack of jurisdiction and will be
refused recognition in other states, except in a few instances.5
So in a Conflict case in considering whether a court has juris-
diction to entertain an action it is helpful to break jurisdiction
down into the following categorization:
(1) Does the state have jurisdiction of the parties defendant
according to the requirements of due process of law?
(2) Does the court have jurisdiction of the subject matter-in
other words is the court authorized to hear the case?
(8) If the conditions enumerated above have been satisfied,
have the requisites of due process as to service and notice been
satisfied?"
To point out, as in this analysis, the close relationship between
jurisdiction and due process does not go very far toward solving
the problems ahead. It does, however, correctly set the stage in
showing that the rules of jurisdiction are dependent to a great
extent upon the requirements of due process. The details of the
two fundamental problems still remain. These are: What are
the reasonable bases of jurisdiction, and, what are the tests or
principles to be applied in determining whether reasonable
standards of due process are used in making service and giving
notice in particular cases? It would be well if these questions
could be discussed separately and the principles as to each
developed on its own. But this is an impossibility for jurisdiction
and due process are so closely connected and related in Conflict
cases that it is rare that one can discuss one without the other
arising. So there is a constant action and re-action between the
5 See, for example, id. at illustration 3. Divorce cases where the court
admittedly does not have jurisdiction since there is no bona fide domicile but the
defendant spouse appears and the principle of res judicata is applied would appear
to be exceptions also.
6 See Cheatham, etc., Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws, 75 (4th ed.
1957).
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two concepts in a Conflict jurisdiction case. This will be apparent
in a discussion now of several well-known cases which are intro-
duced to illustrate certain fundamental principles as to each
concept. It will be equally apparent in later pages of the paper
in the discussion of "reasonable bases of jurisdiction."
B. So~m G,NERAL PPiNCiPLES
It must be kept in mind that jurisdiction and due process are
not strictly American terms; they were used long before the
United States came upon the scene. For that reason the terms
have an international background; foreign cases have interpreted
the words and will continue to do so. That does not change the
fact that when the terms are used in a determination in the
United States they will receive our own interpretation under the
federal constitution. Nevertheless the terms have historic and
international meaning and foreign interpretations lend their flavor
and aid to their understanding. For that reason, it is helpful to
read decisions like the old leading case of Buchanan v. Rucker,
decided in 1808.
In Buchanan, the plaintiff sued in England on a judgment
rendered by the Island Court of Tobago. The action was in
personam but the defendant had never been in Tobago. Sum-
mons in the action was served by nailing a copy to the courthouse
door following local procedure. England refused to recognize
the judgment. First, there was no basis of jurisdiction over the
defendant. As Lord Ellenborough said: "Can the Island of
Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world? Would
the world submit to such an assumed jurisdiction?" To sustain an
action in personam the court must have a reasonable basis for
assuming jurisdiction, there must be sufficient contact to justify
making a non-resident defendant defend a suit in the local juris-
diction. Here there was no contact whatever, not even a mini-
mum contact. The case fails also in due process. Nailing a
summons to the local courthouse door could have no expectation
of giving notice to a foreign defendant. So the case is about as
extreme as can be imagined in failure of a basis of jurisdiction
and in lack of due process in method of service.
While the Buchanan case presents an extreme situation where
there has been no contact with the foreign defendant, not even
[Vol. 54,
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a minimum or casual one, which might serve as a basis of jurisdic-
tion and where the service of process held no hope whatever of
notice to the non-resident, there are naturally many cases which
present much less extreme situations as to one or both factors
and yet the local court is unable to render a valid judgment or
one entitled to recognition in other states because there is either
no acceptable basis of jurisdiction or no satisfactory service of
process or neither.
Indeed it is difficult to determine in some cases whether
acceptable standards are satisfied, since the decision is necessarily
a close one, as matters of debatable policy are often involved.
So it becomes important to determine from a reading of the cases
just what are the acceptable standards as to basis of jurisdiction
and service of process-not only what are the rules and principles
to be employed but what are their limits and limitations. The
commonly accepted bases of jurisdiction will be used to discuss
these matters.
C. BASES OF JURIsDICMoN OVER PERSONS
1. Presence
What is the rationale of mere presence as a basis of jurisdic-
tion? Well, geographically the defendant is there. Since he is
there, the court has physical power over him. Justice Holmes
once said: "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."'
On another occasion he stated that "ordinarily jurisdiction over a
person is based on the power of the sovereign asserting it to seize
the person and imprison him to await the sovereign's pleasure."8
Such statements undoubtedly represent the original historical
concept of jurisdiction. Migration for the purpose of suit or for
the purpose of evading suit were practically unknown in early
societies. Besides, as Holmes points out, it appears that the early
suit had its jurisdictional inception in an arrest of the defendant
or personal direction to him to compel his presence for the trial.9
But aside from these early technicalities, it seems that presence
7 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1916).
8 Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 853 (1913).
9' See Philadelphia B. & WV. R. Co. v. Catta, 85 AtI. 721, 724 (Del. 1913).
Sturnberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws, 70 and fn. 20 (3rd ed. 1963).
Ehrenz-weigq, Co~ct of Laws, fn. 41 (1962). Ehrenzweig at pp. 77-78 is critical
of Holhmes ' presence- hysical power concept, but see Cheatham, Goodrich, etc.,
Conflict of Laws 95, ei 2 (4th ed., 1957).
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would naturally be the simplest and earliest basis of jurisdiction
for suit. Domicile, for example, would seem to be a refinement
of, and extension of, the presence concept. The domicile concept
is much more complicated and sophisicated than the presence
one as will be found in subsequent discussion.
Surely, one who thinks he has been wronged should be able
to sue somewhere. What could be more simple and natural than
that the suit should be brought where the defendant is present,
unless the presence is merely temporary and the facts indicate
that the forum is inconvenient. So presence, as such, is not a
basis of jurisdiction about which one should quibble.
When, however, one turns from substantial presence as a
basis of jurisdiction to mere temporary or casual presence, the
situation becomes immediately debatable. And yet, the law is
temporary presence may serve as a basis of jurisdiction. Knowing
the technicalities of the definition of domicile, one would not
wish to make domicile a necessary requisite of jurisdiction. And
presbnt continued presence is not a requisite of domicile anywayl
But to go to the extreme extent of making a mere temporary
presence, even a casual one, a basis of jurisdiction is another
matter. It would seem to be hard to justifyl
Numerous cases support, however, the rule and the Restate-
ment gives credence to it: Sec. 78. Presence Within The State.
"A state has jurisdiction over an individual who is present within
its territory, whether permanently or temporarily."0 In Peabody
v. Hamilton" the defendant was a transient en route from Nova
Scotia to New York. Service was made on him on board a British
steamer in Boston harbor, after the boat had reached her dock
but before she was moored to it. Jurisdiction and personal service
were upheld, the court saying: "When the party is in the state,
however transiently, and the service is actually served upon him
there, the jurisdiction of the court is complete, as to the person
of the defendant."-2 In fact, statutes providing for something less
than personal service on one temporarily within the state have
been held sufficient to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction
of the court. Thus, in Durfee v. Durfee,13 the defendant, a
10 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 78 (1956).
11 106 Mass. 217 (1870). Accord, Darrah v. Watson, 86 Iowa 116 (1872).
12 106 Mass. 217, 220 (1870).
1a 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936).
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resident of Rhode Island, was served, while on business in
Massachusetts, by registered letter mailed to his Massachusetts
post office address and was held to be properly before the court.
If temporary presence is accepted as a basis of jurisdiction in
such a case, service by registered letter undoubtedly satisfies the
requisites of due process.14 A more important question is whether
service reasonably calculated to reach the defendant, but which
does not, in fact, do so, would be sufficient in such a case. This
will be discussed later.
Some courts have even gone so far with the transient presence
rule as to permit its use as a basis of jurisdiction when the
purpose of the plaintiff in suing the defendant who was tempo-
rarily present was to obtain an advantage over him by preventing
him from making his defense unless he prolonged his stay in-
definitely. 14a This, it is submitted, is definitely in error. The
courts should not be used to harrass defendants. This is tech-
nicality, not justice. To say that motive makes no difference is
reminiscent of language used by Justice Holmes in a somewhat
similar situationY In that case the plaintiff had lawfully caused
a notice to take depositions in Ohio to be served on the defendant,
who was a resident of Nebraska. When the defendant went to
Ohio for that purpose, plaintiff had him served in an action
brought in that state, which was his motive for having the
defendant come to the state for the depositions. Justice Holmes
in his opinion said that the the plaintiff's motive made no dif-
ference, so long as his act was lawful. A better view is expressed
in a Kentucky case where the court said: "It is not the truth or
falsity of the representation that constitutes the fraud. It is the
concealed motive lying in the breast of the appellant which
prompted him to make the representation." 6
a. Limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction based upon
presence.
(1) Fraud and force.
A state does not always exercise jurisdiction over individuals
within its territory. There are situations where the state, as a
'4 This is the view of the Restatement. Restatement (Second), Conflict of
Laws, § 78, comment b (1958).
14a Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 Ad. 714 (1895).
15 Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144 (1905).
16 Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky. 624, 629 (1880).
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matter of policy, may refuse to exercise jurisdiction. An example
is where a non-resident is brought into the state by fraud,
17
although, unfortunately the rule is different on the criminal side.'
It is commonly stated in civil suits that in fraud cases the court
has jurisdiction but refuses to exercise it as a matter of policy,
but that, if the court does exercise jurisdiction in such a case, a
sister state should give full faith and credit to the judgment.
That is the position of the Restatement of Conflicts, Second.' In
such a case, it is argued that the local state has physical power
over the defendant and if it chooses to exercise jurisdiction rather
than refrain from doing so, other states should give recognition
to the judgment. ° While this is the prevailing view and this is its
rationalization, it is submitted that a better and more direct view
would be that the fraud vitiated jurisdiction. Fraud vitiates in a
number of other instances in the law and a plaintiff who has
practiced fraud on the defendant-and the court-should not be
permitted to profit by his own opprobrious conduct.
It is also the better view that a court will not exercise juris-
diction as a matter of policy when the defendant is brought into
the state by force,2' but the law-or at least the language of the
courts-on this point is not too clear. 2 Unfortunately, as in the
case of fraud, the rule is otherwise on the criminal side.P
A Caveat in the Restatement of Conflicts that "the Institute
expresses no opinion whether a state has jurisdiction over a non-
domiciliary brought within its territory by the use of unlawfl
force"2 4 is responsible for much of the current unclarity in the
law on the question, it is believed. Stumberg mentions an illustra-
tive situation that may be responsible for the Caveat-the type of
situation that might well have been put from the floor when
section 78 of the Restatement was being considered at the meet-
ing of the Institute to consider this portion of the work by the
Conflicts Restatement Reporter. Stumberg creates the situation
1 7 Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 Fed. 700 (2d Cr. 1917).
18 U.S. ex rel. Voight v. Toombs, 67 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1933).
19 Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws § 117c, comment f (1957).
20 Note, Blake, 33 Ky. L.J. 126, 127 (1945); Note, 39 Yale L.J. 889, 897(1980).
2'Note, Blake, 83 Ky. L.J. 126, 128 (1945). See Ex Parte Edwards, 278
Pac. 910 (Cal. 1929).
22 Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, § 78, Caveat (1956).
2aEx parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D., Tex., 1934).
24 Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, § 78, Caveat (1956).
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of a non-resident brought into a state by force. While leaving
the state in a car and before a reasonable time for his departure
has elapsed, he negligently runs down and injures B who serves
him with process before his exit. Should the fact that he was
brought into the state by force serve as an immunity to a suit by
B in the state for the negligent tort? This, it is submitted, would
seem unfair to B.2G Various other possible situations may be sug-
gested and it is doubtless illustrations such as these which caused
the framers of the Restatement to utter the Caveat rather than an
affirmative rule of immunity, where the defendant is brought into
the jurisdiction by force.
It should be pointed out that similar situations may arise
where the defendant is brought into the state by fraud. Before
a reasonable time has elapsed for his departure he may also be
guilty of negligence or some other legal wrong which is injurious
to third persons, just as when he is brought into the state by force.
And yet, the Restatement utters no Caveat as to whether a state
has jurisdiction in fraud cases. Why not?
It is believed that if the Restatement utters a Caveat in the
"force" cases, it should issue one in the "fraud" cases as well.
However, it is submitted that the problem should not be handled
by a blanket Caveat in either instance. A refusal to take a posi-
tion at all as to whether the state has jurisdiction in cases where
the defendant is brought into its territory by fraud or force is
unfortunate. The defendant should be immune from local juris-
diction in such cases except in a situation injurious to a third
person-where on the facts the scales of justice incline toward the
protection of the interests of the third person more than those
of the defendant.20 But how is the limitation to be stated?
It is suggested that two changes in section 117c of the Restate-
ment of Conflicts would achieve a more equitable and fair result
than the present handling of the problem of fraud and force in
the Restatement. Such a suggested revision of the Restatement
might then read somewhat as follows: "A state does not have
judicial jurisdiction over a defendant who is brought into the
jurisdiction by fraud or force, except where he is himself guilty
25 See Stumberg's discussion, Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws, 74
(3d. ed., 1963). See also Note, 39 Yale L.J. 889, 896 (1930).
26 See Note, 39 Yale L.J. 889, 897 (1930).
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of negligence or some other legal wrong while in the state which
is injurious to a third person or where he remains within the
territory of the state after a reasonable time has elapsed for his
departure."27
(2) Parties and witnesses.
Persons within the state as parties and witnesses in a suit are
exempt from service during such proceedings and for a reasonable
time thereafter to permit them to leave the state. Since such
persons are physically present within the state, the courts, as in
the case of fraud and force, are granting them immunity as a
matter of policy to leave parties free to come into the state as
parties litigant and to serve as witnesses. This policy, which has
generally been construed liberally, has been extended to persons
appearing in the taking of depositions and other legal pro-
cedures. 9
(8) Inconvenient forum. Its relation to jurisdiction based
upon presence.
A possible limitation on presence as a basis of jurisdiction over
non-residents is the doctrine of inconvenient forum.30 Where the
cause of action arose in another state, or the defendant is domi-
ciled in, a resident of, or has his business in another jurisdiction,
it is highly arguable, and even decisive in many cases, that the
local state where he is served because of his presence there, is
not a proper or fair ground wherein to litigate a case which has
no relation to the local state other than he was served while
present in that jurisdiction. The doctrine of inconvenient forum
is, however, a doctrine of discretion and where a local lawyer
has filed a suit representing the plaintiff considerable pressure is
upon the local court to take jurisdiction, based upon the tech-
nicality of presence.3' In addition presence as a basis of jurisdic-
27 Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144 (1905), which is cited in fa. 15, supra, and
criticized in the text at that point because the court grounded the decision on
what is considered as a bad motive, may be right in result in its decision, the
court holding that the court bad jurisdiction, because the defendant lingered
several days within the jurisdiction, during which time he was served, although
a reasonable time had elapsed for his departure after the taking of the depositions.2 8 Stewart v. Ramsey, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); Restatement, Second, Conflict
of Laws, § 117d, comment b (1957). See Note, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 94029 Note, Blake, 33 Ky. L.J. 126 128 (1930).
30 See Schlesinger, 9 Journal o? Public Law 313, 322-327 (1960).
(1960).
81 Id. at 823.
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tion is an old, established doctrine, never questioned until very
recently. So, while the doctrine of inconvenient forum should
serve as an efficient and effective limitation upon the exercise of
jurisdiction in all presence cases, and especially where the de-
fendant is a transient, it has failed, as a practical matter to do so.32
(4) Need for further limitation upon temporary presence as
a basis of jurisdiction.
Currently the rule that jurisdiction can be obtained over non-
residents based upon their presence within the state, is under
intense criticism. The current attack was engendered largely by
Ehrenweig in a series of articles3 3 and it is being vigorously
continued by him. His attack appears unsound on historical
grounds in that it overlooks the fact that the "English courts for
centuries obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant by
arresting him."3 Be that as it may, it makes little difference, if
the rule is unsound under modern conditions. There is little to be
said for the continuance of a historic rule, other than that it is
long-standing, if the reason for its creation no longer exists and
there is no sound rationalization for its continues existance.
So the question is, Is the rule sound today? The writer takes
a firm position that the rule stated without limitation is unsound
today. Ehrenweig's attack and discussions aroused by it led to
round table, panel discussion of jurisdiction over non-residents
temporarily within the state under the topic heading of "Transient
jurisdiction," which appears in 9 Journal of Public Law.35 The
panelists in this discussion support Ehrenweig's thesis in the
large, but one finishes the readings in a somewhat defeatist frame
of mind-the transient jurisdiction rule is bad, it is said, but it is
so firmly established that it will be impossible to overthrow it
for a long time-if ever. Schlesinger, one of the panelists, pessi-
mistically says: "As yet no lawyer has been bold enough to risk
his client's money in a frontal attack upon the rule." 6
32 Ibid.
33 See Ehrenveig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 'Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956); and Pennoyer is Dead
-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 Rocky Mlt. L. Rev. 285 (1958). See also fn. 9, supra,
and the text at that point.
34 See Cheatham, etc., Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws, 111, fn. 1
(5th ed., 1964).
35 9 Journal of Public Law 281-337 (1960).
36 Id. at 316.
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Such talk is over-defeatist, to say the least, it is believed. It
fails to take into account the fact that the rule has not been
seriously questioned until quite recently. Now it is seriously ques-
tioned by most of those who write upon it. If the rule, as his-
torically stated, has a current friend, he is not speaking up. The
wonderful capacity of the law for growth and change which has
been demonstrated so many times in so many different areas in
the last thirty-five years may manifest itself here much sooner
than might be expected. When the writers in legal periodicals
and professional texts make a concerted attack upon an out-
moded doctrine, it usually causes a change or modification in the
rule. Ehrenzweig's attack remains the major one. The panel dis-
cussion on transient jurisdiction in 9 Journal of Public Law con-
tributes a brilliant and persuasive discussion of the most impor-
tant phases of the problem. Twenty years ago Max Rheinstein
took a vigorous swing at the historical rule when he said in a book
review: "Under the irrational rules of jurisdiction which presently
prevail in the United States, a defendant may be sued in a state
with which he has no contact other than that of his just happening
to be there when a process server catches up with him...-$ The
fight against the historic rule is not only on; it is gaining in
intensity.
Should the rule that transient presence may serve as a basis
of jurisdiction be abolished? The writer takes the view that
perhaps the rule should be continued at least for the present
but with decided limitations. The rule broadly stated causes
repeated instances of great injustice to particular defendants who
are forced because of a technical rule of procedure to defend suits
in jurisdictions which are not only inconvenient but manifestly
unfair. And yet, there are situations where it is not only fair but
just that a non-resident should stand suit in a jurisdiction where
he was only temporarily present when served in the action.
Professor Richardson, procedure professor at the University of
Kentucky Law School, puts the case where a non-resident from
Ohio on a day's hunting trip into Kentucky negligently shoots the
cow of a Kentucky farmer. He is served in an action upon the
jurisdictional fact of presence before he gets out of the state. In
such a case he should be forced to stand trial in Kentucky. Other
3 7 f heinstein, Book Review, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 83, 91 (1942).
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instances where temporary presence should serve as a basis of
jurisdiction suggest themselves, for example, where an elusive
defendant is finally caught in a jurisdiction where he is tem-
porarily present.
On the other hand, situations may be suggested where a
defendant is forced to defend a suit because he was served in a
state with which he had no relation whatever, other than the
fact that he was served therein while temporarily present. Pea-
body v. Fisher5 is such a case. There are numerous others.
The problem is how to limit the rule that presence may serve
as a basis of jurisdiction so that the jurisdictional interests of both
plaintiffs and defendants may be protected, so far as that is ob-
jectively possible.
It is suggested that this might be done by restating section 78
of the Restatement of Conflicts, Second, so that it would read: "A
state has jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its
territory, whether permanently or temporarily, provided that,
balancing the interests of the parties"9 it appears that there has
been sufficient contact vith the state to justify a suit therein, or
the defendant is so elusive that it would be difficult to "find" him
in a state which would have jurisdiction of the case under
ordinary, more acceptable principles."
The suggested provision provides that the presence of a
defendant in a state without further connection would no longer
in itself confer jurisdiction upon its courts,4 ° unless the defendant
were so elusive that it would be difficult to "find" him in a state
having a more satisfactory basis of jurisdiction.
This modification of the historic presence rule is in accord
with the criterion enunciated by Justice Holmes in McDonald v.
Mabee41 and repeated by Justice Douglas in Milliken v. Meyer
42
and in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington43 that bases
of jurisdiction as well as methods of service should satisfy reason-
able standards of "fair play" and "substantial justice." This stand-
ard has been repeated in a number of recent decisions and repre-
3s 106 Mass. 217 (1870).
:" See the discussion, Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws, 68 (3d ed.,
1963) and fn. 12 thereon.
4" Id. at 69.
41 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
42. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
43 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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sents the current conception of the reasonable requirements of
due process. The historic presence rule does not satisfy this
criterion in numerous cases. It is believed that the suggested
modification of the rule does satisfy it reasonably well.
In conclusion, it is suggested that a re-examination should be
made to determine whether the time has come to entirely abolish
transient presence as a basis of jurisdiction. Ehrenzweig appar-
ently is of this opinion 44 and some others are inclining toward that
view. The doing of an act, introduced into the law about thirty-
five years ago in Hess v. Pawlosky45 as a basis of jurisdiction,
would take care of many of the transient presence cases, for
example, the one put by Professor Richardson, where the Ohio
hunter, on a day's hunting trip into Kentucky kills the plaintiffs
cow. Of course, there is no reason why the doing of an act cases
should be limited to situations coming within the state's police
power. Any substantial act within the state should be sufficient
to give jurisdiction and the rule has been extended so that this is
pretty much the law now. Domicile may also serve as a reason-
ably satisfactory basis of jurisdiction in some non-resident cases
now grounded on presence. It is possible that in some transitory
causes of action, where the defendant is elusive, no recognized
basis of jurisdiction other than temporary presence would suffice.
But the question of the entire abolishment of the transient pres-
ence rule should be explored and, if this were done, it is entirely
possible that the ancient rule would be eliminated completely.*
44For example, see Ehrenweig, Conflict of Laws, § 30 (1962).
45274 U.S. 852 (1927).
* Appreciation is expressed to Bennie J. Harrison, 1965 graduate of the
College of Law, University of Kentucky, who has read the manuscript of this
article and who has made a number of valuable suggestions.
